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INTERCIRCUIT CONFLICT WITH RESPECT TO
THE BURDEN OF PROOF STANDARD UNDER THE
FIRE STATUTE AND THE FIRE EXEMPTION
CLAUSE OF THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA
ACT (COGSA)
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, United States courts refused to accept any means of limiting ship-
owner/carrier liability.' This resulted in the failure of American carriers to effectively
compete with foreign shippers. In order to remedy this grave disadvantage and to
encourage investment in American shipping, Congress, in 1851, enacted the Limitation
of Shipowners' Liability Act.' Under this act, a separate exemption known as the Fire
Statute provided for exoneration of the carrier from liability in fire losses:
No owner of any vessel shall be liable to answer for or make good to any person
any loss or damage, which may happen to any merchandise whatsoever, which
shall be shipped, taken in, or put on board any such vessel, unless such fire is
caused by the design or neglect of such owner.3
The Limitation Act did not resolve the ongoing tensions between shippers and
carriers with respect to their respective legal rights. Therefore in 1893, Congress
passed the Harter Act,4 which laid down the general principle of exonerating the carri-
er from certain causes if the carrier exercised due diligence to provide a seaworthy
vessel.5 The effectiveness of the Harter Act's ability to fully address the legal relation-
ship between carriers and shippers was limited at best.
In response to growing tensions among nations with respect to the legal relation-
ship between shippers and carriers, international maritime conferences in the early 20th
century established the Hague Rules.6 These Rules were based on the Harter Act prin-
ciple and included a fire exemption clause, although nothing was mentioned regarding
allocation of the burden of proof.
In 1936 Congress enacted the Carriage of Goods By Sea Act (COGSA), which is
the American enactment of the international Hague Rules.7 Section 1304(2)(b) of
1. Joseph A. Calamari, The Eternal Conflict Between Cargo and Hull: The Fire Statute-A Shift-
ing Scene, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 417 (1981).
2. Act of March 3, 1851, ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635 (current version at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-196
(1988)).
3. 46 U.S.C. app. § 182 (1988).
4. Act of Feb. 13, 1893, ch. 105, 27 Stat. 445 (current version at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 190-196
(1988)).
5. James H. Hohenstein, The Allocation of the Burden of Proof in Marine Fire Damage Cases,
50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1146 (1983).
6. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading,
opened for signature Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, T.S. No. 931, 120 L.N.T.S. 155 (U.S. ratification
proclaimed Nov. 6, 1937).
7. Act of April 16, 1936, ch. 229, 49 Stat. 1207 (current version at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-
Journal of Legislation
COGSA, the fire exemption clause, also provides for exoneration of the carrier from
liability due to fire:
(2) Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising
or resulting from -
(b) Fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier; ....
This section of COGSA is interrelated with 46 U.S.C. § 182 through the language of
46 U.S.C. § 1308, which preserves the carrier's rights and obligations under 46 U.S.C.
§ 182:
The provisions of [the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act] shall not affect the rights
and obligations of the carrier under the [Fire Statute] .... 9
The "design or neglect" language in the Fire Statute has been held to be synonymous
with the "actual fault or privity" language in 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(b).' ° Furthermore,
"privity" emphasizes some fault or act attributable to the carrier while "design or ne-
glect" was said in the United States Supreme Court case of Earle and Stoddart, Inc. v.
Ellerman's Wilson Line, Ltd." to connote the same meaning."
The relevant controversy and circuit split center around application of the burden
of proof to apply under 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(b) and 46 U.S.C. § 182. The Second
Circuit, in Asbestos Corp. Ltd. v. Compagnie De Navigation Fraissinet et Cyprien
Fabre,3 places the burden of proof on the shipper to show the carrier's negligence,
after the carrier first establishes that fire is the cause of the damage. 4 In contrast, the
Ninth Circuit in Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Adelaide Shipping Lines, Ltd."' claims that
the burden of proof is on the carrier to first show he exercised "due diligence" to make
his ship seaworthy; only after he demonstrates such proof can he then claim exonera-
tion from liability under 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(b). 6
The crux of the circuit split lies in the fact that while COGSA is silent as to the
allocation of the burden of proof under the fire exemption clause, it explicitly places
the burden on the carrier to prove the exercise of due diligence to provide a seaworthy
vessel. 7 This duty of due diligence is non-delegable and encompasses not only the
carrier's personal negligence but also the negligence of high-ranked members of the
carrier's crew-agents, managerial/supervisory employees-which is imputed to the
carrier.
On the other hand, cases such as Asbestos Corp. Ltd. require the shipper to prove
the damage was caused by the carrier's design or neglect/actual fault or privity. 8 To
prevail, the shipper must show personal negligence on the part of the carrier by show-
ing the negligence occurred while the vessel was in the carrier's control at the start of
1315 (1988)).
8. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1304(2)(b) (1988).
9. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1308 (1988).
10. Calamari, supra note 1, at 418.
11. 287 U.S. 420 (1932).
12. Calamari, supra note 1, at 427.
13. 480 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1973).
14. Id. at 673.
15. 603 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1979).
16. Id. at 1336.
17. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(1)(a) (1988).
18. 480 F.2d at 672.
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the voyage, and a connection between such negligence and the carrier. This burden of
proof is inconsistent with and contrary to the carrier's burden to prove due diligence
under COGSA 46 U.S.C. § 1303(1)(a), because it is a negation of the carrier's duty to
exercise due diligence.
Such intercircuit conflicts falling under the realm of COGSA have been termed
"intolerable" because they undermine the very purpose that COGSA aims to achieve,
i.e., the implementation of the Hague Rules through "unification of certain rules of law
relating to bills of lading."' 9 The effect of such unification is to be generated not only
within the United States but also throughout the world. As only the Supreme Court can
provide national uniformity, resolving these intercircuit conflicts of international scope
is crucial to accomplishing the goals of COGSA and achieving international uniformity
of interpretation.
Failure to arrive at a resolution is likely to have pernicious consequences. Liti-
gants can exploit COGSA conflicts such as the one presented through forum shop-
ping.' First, a shipper can file an in rem action in any district where the ship is locat-
ed, regardless of the relationship (or lack thereof) between the forum and the suit.21
Second, a shipper can file an in personam action in any location where he can serve
the defendant carrier or attach the latter's property.2 Third, there is a great potential
for forum shopping in the international arena; litigation may take place in any of the
countries involved as well as in a country having no connection with the suit, as long
as a shipper obtains jurisdiction over the ship. The possibility of exempting this option
contractually is doubtful by virtue of 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) of COGSA, which declares
all contractual exception clauses to be "null and void and of no effect."2 3 Section
1303(8) developed as a result of the growth of contractual exception clauses that pre-
vented shippers from recovery because of their lack of access to evidence against
carriers.2 Finally, as the Ninth Circuit (as seen in Sunkist Growers, Inc.) is more
favorable to shipper plaintiffs, it is likely to see a dramatic increase in the number of
such suits on its docket.25 This not only poses administrative problems for the Ninth
Circuit, but it is also unfair to litigants who properly bring other types of lawsuits in
this jurisdiction.
Given the destructive consequences of the failure to come to a resolution of this
circuit split, it has been suggested that the Supreme Court has not taken any action be-
cause COGSA conflicts such as the one presented are not as easily identifiable as other
types of conflicts.26 Additionally, the Supreme Court has been faulted for permitting
COGSA conflicts to remain unresolved while it burdens its workload with cases whose
importance do not parallel that of COGSA cases.27 As a result of COGSA conflicts
suspending in a state of uncertainty, the Supreme Court has also been accused of ham-
19. Michael F. Sturley, Observations on the Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction in Intercircuit
Conflict Cases, 67 TEx. L. REV. 1251, 1271 (1989).
20. Id. at 1268.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(8) (1988).
24. Hohenstein, supra note 5, at 1153.
25. Sturley, supra note 19, at 1268.
26. Id. at 1265.
27. Id. at 1275.
Journal of Legislation
pering the quality of justice via its self-imposed workload crisis."
II. SECOND V. NINTH CIRCUITS
A. Asbestos Corp. Ltd. v. Compagnie De Navigation Fraissinet et Cyprien Fabre
In Asbestos Corp., a fire which broke out in the engine room of the defendant's
ship was caused by a defective oil pump.29 The ship was crossing the North Atlantic
en route from the United States and Canadian ports on the Great Lakes to European
ports. All of the ship's firefighting equipment was either located in or needed to be
operated from the engine room; usage of such equipment was thus impossible. As a
result, the fire spread to the ship's cargo.30
The District Court concluded that the defendant carrier did not exercise due dili-
gence before and at the beginning of the trip to make the ship seaworthy.3 The court
reasoned that the fire would not have spread to the cargo if the firefighting equipment
had not been located in the engine room. Additionally, the court found the lack of
firefighting equipment was a "design or neglect" and "privity or knowledge," which
amounted to a showing of personal negligence on the part of the defendant." There-
fore, the defendant was not exonerated under 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(b) and 46 U.S.C. §
182.
The Second Circuit affirmed, but its decision was not based on the defendant's
failure to exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy. While it recognized due
diligence and "design or neglect"/"actual fault or privity" as two different standards,
the Second Circuit based its decision on the rationale that the defendant was not ex-
empt from liability only because of his own personal negligence. Therefore the Asbes-
tos court did not incorporate the due diligence standard into 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(b)
and 46 U.S.C. § 182, as neither statute expressly nor implicitly requires such a stan-
dard.
Support of the Second Circuit's interpretation came from the Fifth Circuit in
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. M/V "LESLIE LYKES". 33 The Westinghouse court held
that the burden of proof under the fire exemption clause was such that the carrier first
needs to show the damage was caused by fire. 4 The burden then shifts to the shipper
to prove the fire was caused by the "design or neglect"/"actual fault or privity" of the
carrier.35 In its decision, the Westinghouse court referred to Earle and Stoddart v.
Ellerman's Wilson Line, a United States Supreme Court case which defined "neglect
of... owner" as personal negligence of the owner.'
B. Sunkist Growers Inc. v. Adelaide Shipping Lines, Ltd.
In this Ninth Circuit case, a cargo of the plaintiff shipper's fresh lemons was
28. Id.
29. 480 F.2d at 670.
30. Id. at 671.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 734 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1984).
34. Id. at 206.
35. Id.
36. 603 F.2d at 1329.
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loaded aboard the "Gladiola" for refrigerated transportation to Poland.37 Before depar-
ture, the plaintiff was informed the ship would stop in Ecuador to load bananas. The
plaintiff did not object. When the ship arrived in Ecuador, a fire broke out in the en-
gine room. The fire was caused by the separation of a fitting and ferrule in the low
pressure diesel fuel line; the result was the spraying of fuel oil onto the hot surfaces of
two generators."8 An extra third engineer tried to stop the flow of oil but failed. The
second engineer was also unsuccessful. The flow of oil, however, could have been
easily stopped by turning a valve or pulling a nearby pin.39 The fire was not extin-
guished until three days later. Although the lemons were not damaged, the refrigeration
system was destroyed. Local refrigeration storage or markets could not be found,
which resulted in the distribution of the lemons to the people.'
The District Court found the shipowner was exonerated from liability under 46
U.S.C. § 182 and 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(b).4' The court held that while modifications
of existing equipment could have been undertaken, even a prudent carrier would not
have made such modifications. 4' Furthermore, the court placed the blame on the
ship's crew rather than on the shipowner.
The Ninth Circuit reversed and held the shipowner was required to use due dili-
gence to make his ship seaworthy before he could claim exoneration under 46 U.S.C. §
182 and 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(b). The shipowner failed the due diligence standard by
failing to use a crew properly trained in fire fighting. 43 Therefore the Ninth Circuit
incorporated a due diligence standard under 46 U.S.C. § 182 that must be satisfied
before exemption could be obtained.
To date there is no case that supports the Ninth Circuit's interpretation. Further-
more, no case prior to Sunkist has ever incorporated a due diligence standard.' The
Ninth Circuit's decision, additionally, has generated scholarly criticism. For example, it
has been argued that due diligence has no applicability to 46 U.S.C. § 182.4' The Fire
Statute's only exception is limited by the words "design or neglect." If due diligence is
to be incorporated, it must be done through COGSA, which leaves 46 U.S.C. § 182
intact through the language in 46 U.S.C. § 1308. Even if due diligence is incorporated
into 46 U.S.C. § 182 via COGSA, it would still be uncertain as to whether 46 U.S.C. §
1304(2)(b) itself incorporates due diligence as currently there is no such language in
this section.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has been claimed to have erroneously relied on a
Canadian case, Maxine Footwear Co. v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine
Ltd.,' as persuasive authority.4 Canada has no Fire Statute but a fire exemption
clause in the Canadian counterpart to COGSA.4' Therefore, Maxine Footwear would
37. 603 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1979).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1330.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1331.
43. Id. at 1332.
44. Calamari, supra note 1, at 435.
45. Id. at 442.
46. [1959] A.C. 589 (P.C.) (Can.).
47. Calamari, supra note 1, at 442.
48. Id.
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be persuasive authority only with respect to 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(b).49 This makes
Sunkist incomplete and unsound.
III. STATUTORY REVISIONS TO SUPPORT A BETTER
INTERPRETATION
It has been recommended that the seaworthiness/due diligence requirement of
COGSA and the personal aspect of the fire exemption clause (showing that the negli-
gence occurred while the vessel was in the carrier's control; carrier's actual fault or
privity) may be balanced against one another without subordinating one to the other.
This may be achieved by limiting the due diligence requirement such that the carrier
would have the burden of proving the due diligence of those whose conduct would be
imputed to the carrier, i.e., directors, managing agents, and shoreside supervisors,' as
the exercise of due diligence is non-delegable. Therefore, the carrier would need only
show the lack of a connection between unseaworthiness and the carrier's top person-
nel."1 The shipper would bear the burden of proving negligence leading to fire while
the vessel was in the carrier's control.52 By allocating the burden of proof in this
manner, the positions of both the carrier and shipper are given equal weight and cre-
dence.
To reflect this balanced allocation of proof and to avoid future inconsistencies in
statutory interpretation, the fire exemption clause as it now appears should be taken out
of 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(b). A statutory revision would distinguish this fire exemption
by placing it into its own category, after 46 U.S.C § 1304(6) "Inflammable, explosive
or dangerous cargo":
46 U.S.C § 1304(7) Fire. Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for
loss or damage arising or resulting from fire, unless
a) the shipper shows such loss or damage arising or resulting from fire was caused
by the actual fault or privity of the carrier by proving that the carrier's negligence
leading to the fire occurred while the vessel was in the carrier's control, and
b) the carrier fails to prove the exercise of due diligence to provide a seaworthy
vessel by failing to prove the absence of a direct connection between the fire dam-
age and the carrier's top-level personnel, such as supervisors, directors, managers,
and agents.
Therefore, the shipper will prevail if he proves negligence leading to fire occurred
while the ship was under the carrier's control and if the carrier fails to prove absence
of a connection between the fire and the carrier's personnel. In contrast, the carrier
will prevail if the shipper fails to prove negligence leading to fire occurred while the
ship was under the carrier's control and if the carrier proves absence of a connection
between the fire and the carrier's personnel. Each party has his own burden of proof to
bear, and failure to carry such burden will result in liability.
In the interest of COGSA's purpose to achieve and maintain competitiveness be-
tween the United States and foreign shipping industries, the above statutory revision
will probably encourage investment in shipping and promote more contractual relation-
ships between United States shippers and carriers, as shippers will no longer be the
49. Id.




only party to bear the burden of proof, and fairness is dictated in the interest of resolv-
ing shipper-carrier disputes. The economic consequences that will ensue from this
increased investment will be universal. Furthermore, as this revision represents a unifi-
cation of rules in United States commercial maritime transactions, such unification may
have far-reaching and significant global effects in the effort to achieve uniformity of
interpretation in maritime law liability.
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